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Abstract.—The behavior of fishermen is often far more complicated than assumed by fisheries
managers. Those concerned with the Maine lobster (i.e., American lobster Homarus americanus,
hereafter ‘‘lobster’’) fishery have long favored a cap on the number of traps each license holder
can use. Fishermen favor trap limits primarily to cut costs and limit congestion, and managers
believe such limits will help reduce fishing effort. Yet when trap limits were imposed by the
legislature and the lobster zone councils between 1995 and 1998, the number of traps fished in
Maine waters increased greatly. A survey of half the lobster license holders carried out in the
summer and fall of 1998 revealed that the response of fishermen to trap limits was highly differential. Some fishermen reduced, but more increased, the number of traps they fished. A complicated
set of variables influenced those decisions concerning trap numbers, including the regulatory
environment, age and characteristics of the fishermen, relative economic opportunities, and reference group behavior. One of the assumptions running through the literature on fisheries management is that fishermen are homogenous and respond in similar ways to management initiatives.
In fact, if we can judge by the data from the Maine lobster fishery, the response of fishermen to
a management initiative can be quite diverse, and license holders may respond to a wide variety
of social and economic factors in ways that confound the goals of management. This study points
out that the effects of management cannot be ascertained unless we have an accurate and relatively
sophisticated understanding of the myriad factors motivating the decisions of the fishermen.

Theory and Problem
In fisheries management circles, it is an article of
faith and hope that laws designed to cut fishing effort
will, in fact, result in less effort on fish stocks. However, innumerable instances have been recorded
where fishermen have not responded as predicted to
attempts to manage fisheries. Maiolo and Orbach
(1982) point out that the results of fisheries management policies are notoriously difficult to predict.
‘‘Often,’’ they write, ‘‘behavior proceeds in a direction opposite to that predicted! Such seems to be the
case in many areas of fishery policy.’’ In all too many
cases, fishermen have responded to management initiatives in ways that circumvent the goals of management. In some cases, they go into the political
arena and work to have the management regulations
changed or annulled. Sometimes they violate the
rules. In other cases, they innovate their way around
regulations by adopting new technology. In still other
instances, they respond in ways that result in increased effort, even though their actions are perfectly
legal.
This article analyzes the response of Maine lobster (i.e., American lobster Homarus americanus,
hereafter ‘‘lobster’’) fishermen to the imposition
* Corresponding author: acheson@maine.edu
Received May 19, 2000; accepted November 30, 2000

of a 1995 trap limit. Despite the fact that Maine
fishermen are overwhelmingly in favor of a trap
limit, their responses in the years following the
imposition of this law were highly differential.
Many fishermen increased the number of traps they
fished while others decreased that number. The net
effect was that the total number of traps in use
increased after the trap limit was imposed, exacerbating an already serious problem with trap congestion and gear tangles.
Decisions by the numerous fishermen who increased the number of traps fished were influenced
by a complicated set of factors. The objective of
this article is to analyze these factors, with a view
toward understanding their effect on fishing effort
in the Maine lobster industry. Analyzing these factors gives a better appreciation of the complexity
of the decision-making processes of fishermen, the
outcome of which, though perfectly legal, can undermine the cause of management. A secondary
goal is to discuss the kinds of data that need to be
collected if managers hope to predict the response
to regulation and the effect of those regulations.
Maine Lobster Industry and Its Management
The Maine lobster industry throughout its history has been an inshore trap fishery. The typical
lobster fisherman has a boat about 35 ft long
equipped with a diesel or gas engine, which is
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operated alone or with one helper. The typical lobster fishermen in 1997 also had 535 traps (average)
made of wood or wire and equipped with funnelshaped nylon ‘‘heads,’’ which make it easy for
lobsters to climb in the trap but difficult to find
their way out. The traps are connected to a wood
or styrofoam buoy by a ‘‘warp line.’’ The buoys
are painted with a distinctive combination of colors registered with the state that serve to identify
the traps of each license holder (Acheson 1988).
Traps are baited with fish remnants.
The lobster fishery is one of the world’s most
successful fisheries. In an era in which most of a
the world’s fisheries are in a state of crisis, including most of those in the Gulf of Maine, the
lobster fishery is experiencing unprecedented success. Despite heavy fishing pressure, the lobster
catch in Maine has remained very stable since
1947, when the current catch records program began, averaging about 20 million pounds. Since
1989, lobster catches have been in excess of 30
million pounds annually, and in 1997,1998, and
1999 they have exceeded 45 million pounds (Table
1). Although there is no agreement about the cause
of these high catches, we have argued in other
papers that they are due to a long history of effective regulation in combination with environmental factors (Acheson 1997b; Acheson and Steneck 1997).
Virtually all of the conservation laws in force
have been promulgated by the Maine legislature,
which until 1977, had sole responsibility for managing the lobster resource. One of the most important laws is the ‘‘double gauge,’’ a type of slot
measure, which specifies that lobsters can only be
taken if their carapace exceeds 3.25 in but is less
than 5 in. The minimum size measure is designed
to protect juvenile lobsters, while the oversize limit prohibits taking large, reproductive lobsters. It
is also illegal to take female lobsters with eggs
attached to their bellies (i.e., ‘‘berried’’ or egged
lobsters). Moreover, a fisherman may cut a notch
in the tail of egged lobsters caught, and as long as
the ‘‘V-notch’’ lasts (usually two to four molts),
that lobster never can be legally taken because it
is considered ‘‘proven breeding stock.’’ Many
Maine fishermen believe the V-notch law is the
most important conservation measure. According
to Maine law, lobsters may only be taken in traps
equipped with escape vents that allow undersized
lobsters to escape (Acheson 1988; Kelly 1990).
There is strong support for all of these conservation laws in the lobster industry.
In 1995, Maine finally succeeded in obtaining a
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trap limit law, which was part of a comprehensive
law establishing comanagement for the Maine lobster
industry. This law gives certain powers to the industry, while conferring most management control
to the Maine Department of Marine Resources
(MDMR).
In 1977, lobster management was complicated
by the passage of the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA), which made the U.S.
federal government responsible for the management of all fisheries from the 3-mile line out to
200 mi. Currently the governments of the coastal
states generally control the fisheries from the shore
to the 3-mile line. Since 1995, day-to-day lobster
management in the federal zone has been in the
hands of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC), a compact of the coastal states.
However, in 1996 the Sustainable Fisheries Act
was passed, giving agencies of the federal government (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service [NMFS], National Oceanographic and Aeronautics Administration [NOAA], and Department
of Commerce) ultimate authority for ensuring that
all fisheries conservation laws are effective. 1 This
means that the Secretary of Commerce can preempt the power of the ASMFC and the states, if
it is judged they are doing a poor job in managing
‘‘overfished’’ stocks under their jurisdiction.
In practice, state officials and legislatures work
in close coordination with the ASMFC and the
NMFS because everyone recognizes that it makes
little sense to have one set of rules for state waters
and another in the waters under federal jurisdiction. But lines of responsibility between these units
of government are often unclear, and negotiations
are clouded by obfuscation and veiled threats. The
1 This law amends the Fisheries Conservation, and
Management Act (FCMA) of 1977. Among the most
important changes was the provision that if a fishery
were judged ‘‘overfished’’ the stock would have to be
rebuilt within 10 years, and the law gave NMFS a lot
of power to achieve this goal.
2 Advocates for a trap limit argue that having a law
specifying the maximum number of traps a fisherman
could fish would confer benefits for all. There are only
so many lobsters that molt into legal size each year. If
all fishermen were restricted to a smaller number of
traps, they would catch the same number of lobsters over
the annual cycle. There would be substantial savings in
that fewer traps would have to be built, baited, and tended. Moreover, fishing smaller numbers of traps would
allow fishermen to tend them with smaller boats operated
by smaller crews. Perhaps most important, having fewer
traps would alleviate the vexing problems of trap congestion and gear tangles.
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legislation has produced strange alliances and
strategies.
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Establishing a Trap Limit in Maine
In the past few decades, the number of lobster
license holders in Maine has increased modestly,
but the number of traps in use has increased astronomically. In 1970, there were 6,316 license
holders who fished an estimated 1,180,000 traps.
In 1994 there were about the same number of fishermen (i.e., 6,503), but the number of traps had
more than doubled to 2,786,000 (MDMR1994).
Our interviews indicate that fishermen using 300
traps in the 1970s now fish 900–1,000 traps. Trap
escalation has been particularly severe in Casco
and Penobscot bays (zones C, F; Figure 1), where
several hundred full-time fishermen had over
1,500 traps in 1995 and ‘‘gangs’’ of 2,000–3,000
were far from uncommon.
Trap escalation has been driven, in large part,
by competition among fishermen. Several innovations made it possible for fishermen to build and
tend more lobstering gear, including the hydraulic
trap hauler, nylon twine, and a law making it legal
to fish multiple traps on a single line (Kelly 1990).
Shortly after the trap numbers began to escalate
in the 1950s, individuals in the lobster industry
began to lobby for a trap limit, arguing that such
a law would cut costs and reduce trap congestion
while maintaining catches.2 Despite the fact that
large numbers of fishermen were favorably disposed towards a trap limit, for more than 30 years
the legislature failed to pass such legislation. Finally, a trap limit was enacted in 1995 as part of
a comanagement bill.
Efforts to establish a trap limit had foundered
on a lack of consensus in the industry. Legislators,
knowing that there were deep rifts among their
constituents, were unable to agree on any specific
trap-limit bill for two reasons. First, large numbers
of fishermen favored a trap limit, but there was no
consensus on what the trap limit should be, partly
because full-time fishermen generally fished far
more traps than part-time fishermen with other
jobs. Also, the average number of traps fished in
various parts of the coast differed widely. Second,
there was a strong feeling that a trap limit would
do no good unless it was coupled with a limit on
licenses (‘‘limited entry’’), the logic being that a

TABLE 1.—Maine lobster catch, number of traps, and
number of licenses, 1980–1999 (Maine Department of
Marine Resources 1994, with figures for 1995 to 1999
updated by Kelvin Kelly of the MDMR).

Year

Lobster
catch
(millions
of pounds)

Number of
traps

Number of
licenses

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

22.0
22.6
22.8
22.0
19.5
20.0
19.7
19.7
21.7
23.5
28.1
30.8
26.9
30.0
38.9
36.5
36.2
46.9
46.8
53.1

1,846,000
1,825,000
2,143,000
2,340,000
2,175,000
1,766,000
1,595,000
1,909,000
2,053,000
2,001,000
2,130,000
2,015,000
2,012,000
1,860,000
2,786,000
2,408,000
2,605,000
2,646,000
2,832,456
3,043,154

9,200
8,548
8,891
8,895
9,730
7,879
6,875
6,730
6,804
7,215
6,706
6,940
6,162
6,176
6,503
7,409
7,362
7,551
7,626
7,220

trap limit would not relieve congestion if new entrants added thousands of new traps to the fishery.
On several occasions since the 1970s various industry groups have promoted bills combining limited entry and a trap limit. However, limited entry
has always been received with ambivalence because it would limit employment prospects in
coastal towns (Acheson 1975).
By the 1990s, there was a growing interest in
comanagement, which Department of Marine Resources Commissioner Robin Alden and several
key legislators had come to favor.3 Late in the
3 Over the course of 2 decades a sizeable body of
literature had been produced documenting the effectiveness of local management (Ruddle and Johannes
1985; McCay and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Ostrom
1990; Anderson, and Simmons 1993). This gave rise to
a growing interest in comanagement (i.e., governance
structures in which authority to manage fisheries was
shared by government and industry groups; Pinkerton
1989). In 1993, interest in comanagement began to
emerge in the Maine fishing industry, the Marine Resources Committee of the Legislature, and the Maine
Department of Marine Resources after a session on comanagement was held at the Maine Fishermen’s Forum.

←

FIGURE 1.—The lobster management zones (A–G) established in March 1997. Each zone is managed by an
elected council of lobster license holders.
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spring of 1995, the legislature passed what became
known as the ‘‘Zone Management Law’’ (Public
Law 1995, Chapter 468), which was a true comanagement law that incorporated a trap limit.
This broad-based law changed many aspects of
regulation. It established an individual trap limit
of 1,200 traps by the year 2000, a trap tag system
to identify owners of traps, an apprenticeship program for new entrants into the lobster fishery, and
eligibility criteria to qualify for a commercial lobster and crab license.
Most important, this law has created a comanagement system. Specifically, it establishes a
framework by which the Commissioner of Marine
Resources can create lobster policy management
zones. Each lobster zone is managed by an elected
council of lobster license holders. The 1995 law
gave each council the power to propose rules on
(1) the maximum number of traps each license
holder is permitted to fish (a trap limit), (2) the
number of traps that may be fished on a single line,
and (3) the times when lobster fishing will be allowed. If the proposed rules are passed by a vote
of two-thirds of the license holders in that zone,
the zone council is obligated to convey the results
of the referenda to the Commissioner of Marine
Resources. If the Commissioner judges them to be
‘‘reasonable,’’ the rules will become departmental
regulations and will be enforced.
By May 1997, the zones had been established
and the bylaws for the zone councils had been
created (Figure 1). By June 1998, all seven zones
had held referenda in which restrictive trap limits
had been established. Some of these zones have
passed very restrictive trap limits by a wide margin. Zone E, for example, passed a 600-trap limit,
with 82% of voters in favor. These trap limits went
into effect within a few months.
Imposition of trap limits had some serious distributional effects, which quickly led to political
pressure for further legislation. Many of the fulltime fishermen with large gangs of gear became
very unhappy with the trap limits, arguing (with
justification) that these trap limits put them at a
competitive disadvantage and benefited small fishermen. That is, most full-timers had to reduce
traps, while part-timers were free to increase the
numbers of traps they fished. Adding to their chagrin was the fact that trap limits were not reducing
effort.
In Zone G, four full-time fishermen were so unhappy with the 800-trap limit imposed on them
that they sued the state late in 1997, claiming that
the Zone G council had violated its own bylaws.

After months of deliberation, a judge ruled in their
favor and annulled the Zone G trap limit. Zone G
had to go back to the 1,200 trap limit, the maximum allowed by the state. This action left fishermen in Zone G in a liminal state, feeling that all
of their efforts to impose meaningful trap limits
by democratic means had failed.
From 1997 to 1999, some full-time fishermen
persistently argued for changes in rules that would
stop the increase in fishing effort and spread the
cost of conservation more evenly. In 1999, two
laws resulted from these efforts. One was a restraint on trap tag issuance, which essentially permitted people fishing under 800 traps to purchase
only 100 more trap tags than they were issued as
of November 20, 1998 (Public Law 1999, Chapter
397). The second law (Public Law 1999, Chapter
508) made it possible to established limited entry
by zone based on a ratio of entrants to people who
give up their licenses. The first law prevents parttimers from building up the amount of gear they
fish, whereas full-timers are forced to reduce their
trap numbers. The second stops entry into the industry other than through permit transfers and
eventually will reduce numbers of license holders.
In promoting these laws, the full-timers were being
both altruistic and very self serving. Both laws
were designed to stop the trap escalation, which
was continuing despite the moratorium on entry
and trap limits, and limit the competition full-timers
faced from part-timers.
By September of 2000, Zones D, E, F, and G in
the overcrowded western portion of the state had
requested limited entry, and their request was honored by the commissioner in the fall of 2000. In
Zone A, where overcrowding is less and there is
more concern about employment possibilities for
young people, the zone council voted not to seek
limited entry. How Zones B and C will act has yet
to be determined.
Data Sources
Virtually all of the data for this study were obtained in 1998 and 1999 during the course of a
study financed jointly by the University of Maine
Sea Grant Program and the Maine Department of
Marine Resources.
The data for the project were collected by two
different methods. In June 1998, 3,400 questionnaires were mailed to a random sample of lobster
license holders. Approximately half of the license
holders in the state were surveyed in this way, and
862 of these questionnaires were returned (or
24.5%). In addition, four interviewers were hired
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TABLE 2.—License holders changing the number of their traps between 1995 and 1998.
Number and
percentage

Over 200trap
decrease

Decrease
of 1–199
traps

Same
number of
traps

Increase
of 1–199
traps

Over 200trap
increase

License holders
Percentage

160
15.2

19
1.8

260
24.6

350
33.2

266
25.2

by the MDMR to administer the same interview
form in person in all seven lobster zones. Those
to be interviewed at dockside were randomly selected from the license holders in each zone who
had over 400 trap tags and who had not been sent
a mail survey. This produced another 255 interviews. All told, information was obtained from
18% of all the 1997 lobster license holders in the
state. The completed questionnaires were coded
by students at the University of Maine, and their
work was checked by the principal investigator.
The coded data were then used to compile tables,
graphs, and statistics (using Excel and Systat),
which were incorporated into the final report to
the Legislature (Acheson and Acheson 1999). (The
data in Tables 2–5 were obtained from this survey.)
These data were supplemented by telephone interviews with questionnaire respondents who indicated they wished to give additional information.
Sixty additional face-to-face interviews were also
conducted with specially selected respondents to
explore their opinions on trap limits in far more
detail.
Figures on numbers of traps and catches were
obtained from official figures of the Maine Department of Marine Resources (Table 1) and were
updated by Kevin Kelly of the MDMR. Historical
data on the trap limit came from archival sources
and interviews with people who had participated
in the events reported.
Factors Leading to an Increase in Trap
Numbers
Official state statistics (see Table 1) indicate that
in 1994, the year before the trap limit went into
effect, there were a total of 2,786,000 traps in use
in Maine. For the next several years, the number
increased, so that by 1999 there were 3,043,000
trap tags issued (Table 1). Our survey of lobster
fishermen in the summer of 1998 found that fishermen fished a mean number of 432.5 traps in
1990, 503.6 traps in 1995, 552.4 in 1997, and
571.1 in 1998.
More than half of the fishermen increased the
number of traps they fished. As can be seen in
Table 2, Of the 1,055 lobster license holders suc-

cessfully interviewed, 616 or 58.4% reported that
they had increased the number of traps they fished
between 1995 and 1998; 260 or 24.6% said they
fished the same number of traps they had the year
previously; and 179 or 17% said they actually
fished fewer traps than they did in the past year.
4 The net result was an overall increase in the
number of traps fished, not the predicted decrease.
Legislation and Uncertainty
In some ways, fishermen’s response to trap limits was a response to a whole plethora of proposed
and enacted regulations and to uncertainty about
what the future would bring. After 1995, federal,
state, and ASMFC regulations evolved so quickly
that fishermen literally did not know from one
month to another where they stood. As one fisherman responded in a questionnaire, ‘‘We are not
sure who is going to be able to fish, where we will
be able to fish, or how many traps we will be able
to fish.’’ Not knowing what the future would bring,
many thought it necessary to protect themselves.
That is, thinking it unlikely they would be allowed
to increase the number of traps they fished in the
future, they believed they could ‘‘grandfather’’ a
maximum share for themselves by increasing the
traps they were fishing. David Cousins, Maine
Lobstermen’s Association president, summarized
the attitude of many of these men by saying,
‘‘Many guys figured it was now or never.’’
When asked why they had increased the number
of traps they fished between 1995 and 1998, many
license holders openly said they were responding
to uncertainty caused by government action.5 The
4 There is an inconsistency in the data from the surveys concerning the number of fishermen that neither
increased nor decreased the number of traps fished; 260
respondents said they fished the same number of traps
in 1998 as they had in 1995 (Table 2). In responding to
an open-ended question about why they changed the
number of traps they fished, 199 respondents said they
fished about the same number as they had previously
(Table 5).
5 Other social scientists have also noted that the actions of the government have increased risks for fishermen (e.g., Smith. 1988).
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following are typical responses from fishermen received on our survey in explaining why they
changed the numbers of traps they fished: ‘‘Federal
laws. We are afraid of what they might do.’’‘‘You
made me change [i.e., increase traps] by saying
we were going to be limited [to under 1,200
traps].’’‘‘To get the number of traps up. That’s
when the feds, tree huggers, and all the other
groups that know nothing about lobstering put us
on a limit of some kind, hopefully they will leave
me enough to make a living, where 100% of my
living comes from lobstering.’’‘‘Because when
they started fooling with trap limits and issuing
tags, I didn’t know what it would lead to as far as
how many traps I had in the water. So, I increased
the number in case they went by a percentage of
previous years.’’‘‘Over-regulation.’’
Such statements show some free floating anxiety, but they also reflect the fact that fishermen,
and many other observers, were very uncertain
what trap limit would be imposed on them and by
whom. This was partially caused by the uncertainty about whether the referendum votes in the
zones would reflect their individual interests. Men
fishing large amounts of gear were worried (with
justification, it turned out) that their gear could be
limited through the maneuvering of license-holders fishing small and medium amounts of gear.
Conversely, the part-timers were worried that fulltimers would put them out of business by imposing
rules prohibiting fishing late in the afternoon and
on weekends.
In large measure this uncertainty was due to a
jurisdictional issue occurring at the federal level.
At the same time the Maine zone management bill
was being implemented in 1996, the ASMFC announced its lobster management plan in the spring,
fall, and winter of 1996. This plan wisely divided
the lobster-producing area off the Atlantic coast
into six zones, which would be managed with different laws. The ASMFC Zone 1, which included
the coastal lobster fishery from Eastport Maine to
Cape Cod, was to have a V-notch law and an oversize measure (5 in), for which the Maine delegation
had strongly lobbied. There was also to be an increase in the escape vent to 115⁄16 in. Most importantly, the ASMFC plan called for a rolling trap
limit to be imposed in ASMFC Zone 1, including
Maine, which would allow license holders to fish
a maximum of 1,200 traps in 1998, 1,000 traps in
1999, and 800 traps in the year 2000.
Officers of the NMFS were convinced that the
ASMFC plan did not restrict fishing effort sufficiently to conserve lobsters. Empowered by the

Sustainable Fisheries Act, they readied their own
plan, which was rumored to be far more stringent
than the one passed by the ASMFC. Throughout
late 1997 and 1998, there were constant discussions of this plan in industry and management circles. In 1998 the NMFS reported that it was considering a trap limit in which fishermen would
have to ‘‘build down’’ to 475 traps over the course
of 5 years. Large numbers of fishermen were very
upset by this news, fearing that such a low trap
limit would make them into part-time fishermen
or put them out of business all together. Hearings
were held on this plan in 1998, but nothing was
done for months; meanwhile, the industry waited
anxiously. Finally, in December 1999, the NMFS
plan was released in final form. Essentially, it endorsed the ASMFC plan (i.e., 1,200 traps in 1998,
1,000 in 1999, and 800 in 2000), but fishermen
were left wondering whether the ASMFC rules or
the more stringent NMFS rules would prevail.
Their uncertainty was increased by other events
influencing trap limits, such as the limited entry
proposals and the Zone G lawsuit.
The trap-tag provision of the zone management
law raised special anxieties. When the trap-tag law
was passed in 1995, the commissioner promised
that the trap-tag data would never be the basis for
limiting or freezing the number of tags fished.
Many fishermen were very disbelieving, predicting that the government would use the trap-tag
information to freeze the number of traps a person
could fish, or that a required build-down in traps
would be calibrated to the number of tags that a
person had. Indeed, this came to pass. The draft
NMFS plan, which did not come to fruition in
1999, had a provision that fishermen were to build
down to 475 traps by 10%/year from the number
of traps they currently held. Moreover, the Lobster
Advisory Council seriously discussed freezing
traps according to the number of tags a person had
in 1998. As a result, fishermen who increased their
trap tag numbers would be better off if the likely
reduction in trap numbers was ordered.
Throughout this period, lobster fishermen became increasingly aware that control of their industry was passing to people and organizations
(federal bureaucrats, environmentalists, scientists,
judges, etc.) over whom they had little influence
and whose behavior they could not predict or understand. Zone meetings became increasingly devoted to discussing ASMFC rules, NMFS plans,
‘‘whale-take reduction’’ strategies, and lawsuits.
The zone management councils began to react to
events at the state and federal level, rather than

MAINE LOBSTER TRAP LIMIT

solely reflecting the wishes of the fishermen in
their respective zones. In several zones, trap limits
were imposed that mirrored those proposed by the
ASMFC, which most fishermen supported. This
gave many fishermen the feeling that management
was out of their hands, in that the zone councils
felt they were being forced to respond to federal
initiatives.
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Catches, Income, and Increase in Full-Time
Fishermen
Another factor increasing the total number of
traps and average number of traps in use was a
general increase in the number of full-time fishermen. Although the total number of license holders did not increase appreciably in the last 20
years, the number of fishermen whose primary target species is lobster has increased by leaps and
bounds.
In the past, most of the people holding lobster
licenses were part-time lobster fishermen who
earned over half of their income in other jobs (especially other fisheries). In a 1973 study of the
lobster industry, it was estimated that ‘‘less than
a third of the these licensed fishermen could be
considered full time’’ (Huq and Hasey 1973:1;
Acheson 1975: 661).
By the mid 1990s, the majority of lobster fishermen had become full-time lobster fishermen and
earned very little of their income in other fisheries
or in nonfishing jobs. Our 1998 survey showed
that, in every zone, over 50% of the license holders
reported earning between 50% and 100% of their
income from lobstering (Table 3). Over 50% of the
respondents said they earned no income in any
other fishery, and over 50% said they earned nothing in any nonfishing job.
Moreover, our survey substantiated that license
holders earning a high percentage of their income
from lobstering fished a much larger number of
traps than those earning a smaller percentage of
their income from the fishery. In the state as a
whole, license holders earning 75–100% of their
income from the lobster fishery used an average
of 732 traps, those earning 50–74% of their income
from lobstering used 535 traps, and those earning
25–49% of their income from the lobstering used
only 311 traps (Table 4). Clearly the move from
part-time to full-time status was accompanied by
a great increase in the average number of traps
used.
This move into full-time lobstering was prompted by the record high incomes to be earned in the
industry, which stemmed from record high catches
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and good exvessel prices. Although no definitive
study of lobster fishing incomes has been done
recently, there are a number of reliable reports of
mid-1990s lobster fishermen catching over 40,000
lb of lobster and earning over US$200,000 gross
income. In our survey, 264 license-holders of the
1,083 respondees (24.4%) said that they caught
over 25,000 lb of lobster in 1997. Because the
average exvessel price per pound in that year was
about $3.75, it is reasonable to assume that these
men grossed over $93,750 during that year. Other
estimates indicate that full-time fishermen with average-sized operations might gross $65,000 and
have a net income (after taxes and expenses) of
$40,000.
At the same time, conditions in other fisheries
have been terrible. In Maine, catches of groundfish, have plummeted in recent years due primarily
to overfishing (Murawski et al. 1997), which has
resulted in a sharp reduction in numbers of boats
and people employed in that fishery. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, people switched from
groundfishing into a variety of alternative occupations. Many entered the lobster industry on a
full-time basis. However, most had held lobster
licenses but were relatively or completely inactive
in the lobster fishery. Thus, the entry of these men
into the lobster industry has been reflected in the
increase in numbers of traps but not in an increase
in numbers of licenses (Table 1).
Competition
Typically in open-access fisheries, competition
feeds on itself. This certainly occurred in the lobster fishery. Once some men in a harbor expanded
the number of traps, others felt they were forced
to follow suit or see the percentage of traps they
fished decline, along with their incomes. Many,
however, were very reluctant to fish more gear,
knowing that it would contribute to an already severe congestion problem and increase business
costs. They also knew that a trap limit was coming
and that they probably would have to reduce the
numbers of traps they fished in the near future.
However, when faced with the prospect of losing
income to more aggressive fishermen, they put
more traps in the water to keep up with the competition.
The social aspects of competition deserve to be
emphasized as well. Lobstermen are not lone entrepreneurs making decisions with price and income alone in mind. They are members of groups,
which I call ‘‘harbor gangs,’’ who fish from the
same harbor. Members of these groups interact a
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TABLE 3.—Percentage of 1997 income reported as earned from lobstering, by zone.
Zone B

Zone A

Zone C

Zone D

Income
(%)

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

0
1–24
25–49
50–74
75–100
Total

11
27
18
38
104
198

5.5
13.6
9.1
19.2
52.5
100

13
15
14
12
63
117

11.1
12.8
11.9
10.2
53.8
100

7
14
13
22
89
145

4.8
9.6
8.9
15.1
61.4
100

18
29
22
25
162
256

7.2
11.5
8.7
9.9
62.5
100

good deal and depend on each other for mutual
aid, and the group controls many aspects of an
individual’s career. These groups also enable members to measure themselves against one another in
assessing relative success and skill, and a tremendous amount of prestige is garnered by the ‘‘high
liners’’ (the most successful fishermen) in the
group. Much approbation can be heaped on inept
fishermen (Acheson 1988: 48–59). Under these
conditions, keeping up with the competition not
only maintains income but also one’s social standing.
Factors Leading to a Decline in Trap
Numbers
Of those interviewed in our 1998 survey, 179
respondents (17%) said they had fished fewer traps
between 1995 and 1998 (Table 2). Three different
factors were involved, which are relatively
straightforward and easy to understand.
Trap Limit
There were a number of license holders in the
sample who reduced the number of traps they
fished because of the trap limit. When the zone
management law went into effect in 1996, fishermen with over 1,200 traps were forced to begin
to reduce the number of traps they fished in increments to meet the state-mandated 1,200-trap
limit. When the zone trap limits were announced
in 1997 and 1998, more fishermen had to begin to
reduce the number of traps they fished. Still others
who had consistently favored a trap limit reduced
the number of traps they fished by attrition, in the
certain knowledge that trap limits were coming and
that it was nothing short of foolish to buy more
traps under these circumstances. These people
were making the kind of choice many observers
had assumed would be general in the industry.
Age and Illness
Some in our survey said they were reducing the
number of traps they fished due to either increasing

age or illness or because they were entering retirement or semiretirement. Others cited illness of
someone in their family. Those who were scaling
down with retirement in mind almost certainly did
not increase the number of traps they fished. Younger men with injuries or illnesses were, however,
likely to increase the number of traps they fish
after they recover.
Overcrowding and Shore-Based Job
Another set of respondents reduced the number
of traps they fished either because they had to devote more time to a full-time job, because of severe
trap overcrowding, or both. A few of them were
leaving fishing altogether to enter another business
or go back to school. Others said they were reducing the number of traps they fished because
they were going back to ‘‘fishing singles’’ (i.e.,
fishing one trap on a line) as a means of coping
with gear congestion. One man said, ‘‘I am getting
a lot of overtime now (on his full-time job) and
haven’t got as much time for lobstering as I used
to. With all the tangles it takes me longer to pull
my gear than it used to. When 50 traps wore out
last fall, I didn’t replace them.’’
Reasons to Change Trap Numbers
How important were these factors in influencing
the decisions of fishermen concerning the changes
in trap numbers? This is difficult to say because
the questionnaires and follow-up interviews revealed that many men were influenced by a number
of variables. However, some indication of relative
importance of these variables can be obtained from
analyzing the answers to the survey question: ‘‘If
you changed the number of traps you fished in the
last 5 years, explain why you made these changes?’’ The answers received are summarized in Table 5.
The responses to this question indicate that the
most important factor influencing an increase in
traps is an increase in economic opportunities in
the lobster fishery brought about by high stock
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TABLE 3.—Extended.
Zone F

Zone E

Zone G

State

Income
(%)

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

0
1–24
25–49
50–74
75–100
Total

12
21
9
20
81
143

8.4
14.7
6.3
13.9
56.6
100

21
28
9
12
77
147

14.3
19.0
6.1
8.2
52.4
100

7
15
3
12
76
113

6.2
13.2
2.6
10.6
67.2
100

89
149
88
141
652
1,119

7.9
13.3
7.9
12.6
58.3
100

sizes and record high catches. There was money
to be earned in the lobster fishery, and people responded by putting more traps in the water to get
higher catches and returns. They phrased the reasons for their actions in different terms: 161 said
they were ‘‘expanding [their] business,’’ 139 said
they were putting more traps in the water to get
more income for ‘‘consumption purposes,’’ and 41
said they were expanding the number of traps they
fished to get money for a ‘‘new investment,’’ such
as a boat. The 341 fishermen giving these three
answers represented 30% of the whole sample.
Another important reason for increasing the
numbers of traps—keeping up with the competition or reference group—was indicated by 130
(11%). Sixty-one license holders (5%) increased
traps fished because of the uncertainty brought
about by regulation and government actions. But
concern about the actions of government may have
been more of a factor than these numbers alone
indicate. That is, general concern with actions of
the government was laced throughout the responses. Fishermen were very aware that bureaucracies
were in the process of making sets of decisions
that would redefine lobster fishing. They also knew
that they had direct control only over the zone
management process, and many were not certain
zone referenda would produce the results they
wanted. So, the fishermen were certainly preoccupied with positioning themselves for an uncertain future.
Another 51 (5%) indicated that they were mov-

ing into lobster fishing from other troubled fisheries or shore-based jobs. Although many lobster
fishermen in recent years have been very concerned about the influx of ‘‘draggermen’’ and people from other fisheries, such movement since
1995 has been relatively slight. However, movement out of the failing groundfish industry has
been ongoing since the late 1980s; thus far, more
than 3% of the lobster license holders have experience in the groundfish fishery.
Three reasons were mentioned for decreasing
the numbers of traps fished: age or illness, the trap
limit, and a switch to a shore-based job. None of
these factors motivated large numbers of fishermen, and all three reasons appear to be of equal
importance in motivating their use of fewer traps.
The fact that fishermen chose to increase the
number of traps they fished in the face of a trap
limit, is certainly counterintuitive. I was one of
many who predicted that the number of traps fished
would quickly decline when the trap limit was imposed. We were wrong. In retrospect, it is difficult
to understand our lack of insight, particularly when
all of the variables that produced the increase in
traps were present in 1995 when the lobster zone
management law embodying the trap limit was
passed.
Broader Issues for Fisheries Management
The fact that regulations designed to cut fishing
effort resulted in increasing effort raises a number
of questions for managers.

TABLE 4.—Average number of traps fished in 1997, by percentage of income from lobster fishing.
Income
from
lobstering
(%)

Zone A

Zone B

Zone C

Zone D

Zone E

Zone F

Zone G

State
average

0
1–24
25–49
50–74
75–100

32
218
302
553
735

71
93
313
552
569

53
169
381
501
674

34
136
276
590
844

11
143
337
347
584

37
134
232
553
929

25
169
333
651
790

38
152
311
535
732
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TABLE 5.—Primary explanations for changing numbers
of traps used.
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Reason

offered a

Competition
Uncertainty due to laws and government
action
Expanding business
Increase income for investment (new
boat, etc.)
Increase income for consumption (bills,
college, house)
Switching to lobstering from less desirable fishery
Switching to lobstering from shore job
(increase)
Decrease due to trap limit
Decrease due to age or illness
Decrease due to overcrowding or switch
to shore-based job
Fishing about the same number
Other explanation or no explanation
Total
a

Number of
fishermen

Percentage of
cases

130

11

61
161

5
14

41

4

139

12

20

2

31
47
77

3
4
7

72
199
158
1,136

6
17
14
100

Some are reasons given for increasing the number of traps fished;
others are reasons for decreasing trap numbers.

Industry Heterogeneity and Management
One of the problems that has attracted the attention of the small group of social scientists interested in fisheries management is the reactions
of fishermen to regulations. In general, this group
of authors has stressed the costs and unforeseen
consequences of management measures. This issue
was discussed in detail by Estellie Smith (1978)
in a paper entitled ‘‘What you wants is results.
What you gits is consequences.’’ Many of the consequences are very counterproductive. We are told
that ‘‘subsidies will result in over development of
the fleet’’ (McGoodwin 1990: 171). Managing
stocks by imposing taxes on vessels will not motivate people to switch target species or vessels
quickly enough to reduce effort on overfished species (Crutchfield 1979; Beddington and Rettig
1984). Restricting gear and technology can result
in evasion of rules (McGoodwin 1990). Management by size rules will result in high grading (discarding dead, undersized fish; Anderson 1977).
Management by total allowable catches (TACs)
will probably result in overcapitalization (McGoodwin 1990: 169). Closed seasons will divert
fishing pressure to unclosed areas and ‘‘encourage
overcapacity in the fleet [and a] competitive race
for fish’’ (Anderson 1977: 168). Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can result in ownership of
rights to fish concentrated in the hands of a few
(Palsson and Helgason 1996: 53). There are un-

doubtedly cases where large numbers of skipper
and vessel owners did respond in these ways.
One problem with these ideas is that they embody a simplistic view of the behavior of fishermen. It assumes that fishermen are homogenous
and make similar decisions in response to regulations. The data from the Maine trap-limit case
suggests this is a vastly oversimplified view. In
Maine, fishermen’s response to the new trap limit
was highly differential and driven by a complicated set of factors. This was true even though
these people were in the same fishery, used the
same gear, and faced the same market possibilities
and most of the same regulatory constraints.
This has profound implications for management.
If social scientists and managers are going to predict the effects of management, they will have to
predict how fishermen will respond to management
initiatives. Rules that result in all fishermen lowering effort will have one effect on stocks; rules
that motivate large numbers of fishermen to evade
the regulations or increase effort will very likely
have another effect. Gathering such data poses
some major problems. There are three kinds of
variables affecting fishermen’s decisions. One is
the organizational features and subculture of the
fishing industry in question. The second is the
characteristics of the fishermen in question (e.g.,
age, education, borrowing capacity, family income, commitment to the industry and community,
etc.), which vary widely. Each fishing industry has
some unique organizational and cultural features,
and there are likely to be dozens of personal variables that influence decisions. The third variable
is the degree of uncertainty caused by management
itself and the probable response of various sets of
fishermen to that uncertainty. This means that if
we want to understand the range of responses of
fishermen to a regulation, broad generalizations
will not suffice. Managers will need specific studies of the complex decisions of fishermen to each
proposed rule, industry by industry. Those studies
ideally should be done by someone who is very
knowledgeable about the industry in question.
Two different kinds of studies might be contemplated in this connection. The first would focus on
asking fishermen how they would respond to specific proposals and why. Under some conditions,
such studies can produce misleading results (Ordeshook 1986), but if done correctly they can be
very revealing.
Another kind of approach that would produce
useful information are case studies documenting
what really happened in fisheries when regulations
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were imposed. These case studies would focus on
the responses of various classes of fishermen to
management decisions and the effect of those decisions on the stocks. One such set of studies appears in the volume edited by Palsson and Petursdottir (1997) on the effects of various kinds of
quota systems in North American and European
fisheries. Much the same thing could be done with
other kinds of management techniques.
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The Relative Success of the Maine
Comanagement Law
Does the fact that the number of traps increased
after the trap limit indicate the Maine comanagement law has failed? If we take a short view, it
might seem that management efforts have been
less than successful, but it is difficult to make the
case for failure if we take a longer view of the
problem. To be sure, the trap limit law has not
produce the quick reduction in traps hoped for, but
the response of the industry to this temporary setback was to lobby [successfully] for a limited entry
law. The combination of the trap limit and limited
entry will almost certainly bring a reduction in the
number of traps in time. It is difficult to imagine
how numbers of traps can continue to climb in the
long term (Table 1) when the number of traps is
capped at 600 or 800 and the numbers of licenses
will decline. Moreover, even in the short term,
these rules have almost certainly had an effect.
Were it not for the trap limits and moratorium on
licenses, the boom in the lobster industry would
almost certainly have attracted additional fishermen and motivated established fishermen to buy
even more traps.
To focus on the fact that traps in the Maine
lobster industry increased after a trap limit was
imposed is to overlook the most important fact
concerning zone management in Maine—namely
that Maine lobster fishermen have been very successful in constraining themselves. This happens
all too rarely. In all too many cases, fishermen
operate with a ‘‘gold rush’’ mentality and seek to
take as many fish as quickly as possible, regardless
of the consequences for the stock. The result is the
well-known ‘‘tragedy of the commons.’’ If the experience with the comanagement law in Maine has
done nothing else, it has demonstrated that it is
possible for fishermen to curb their own exploitive
effort under some conditions. Those conditions are
very complicated and have been described in detail
(Acheson 1997a, Acheson 2000, Acheson and Wilson 1996; and Acheson and Knight 2000). Whether

these factors are replicated elsewhere is an open
issue.
This suggests that one of the most important
problems facing fisheries management is determining under what circumstances fishermen will
generate rules to conserve fisheries. As the rational
choice theorists can attest, such a determination is
not at all obvious (Elster 1989; Knight 1992).6
Nevertheless, it is probably the ultimate question
facing managers at present.
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